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In December 1784, a small contingent of upper Tennessee Valley political 
leaders met in Washington County, North Carolina’s, rustic courthouse to 
discuss the uncertain postrevolutionary political climate that they believed 
threatened their regional political hegemony, prosperity, and families. The 
Jonesboro delegates fatefully decided that their backcountry communities 
could no longer remain part of their parent state and that North Carolina’s 
westernmost counties (at the time Washington, Sullivan, and Greene coun-
ties) must unite and form America’s fourteenth state.1 From 1785 through 
1788, the leaders of the Franklin separatist movement struggled to secure 
support for their state from the U.S. Confederation Congress, the North 
Carolina General Assembly, high-profile national political figures, and 
their bitterly divided neighbors. Throughout the three-year effort to win 
Franklin’s admission into the union, violence and the threat of violence 
plagued the political movement.
Despite involving a relatively small number of western residents and 
the state of Franklin’s brief existence, Amerindian clashes, internal political 
factionalism, and divisive western political policies resulted in a high level 
of backcountry bloodshed in the upper Tennessee Valley. From supposed 
violent tendencies culturally engrained in the region’s Scotch-Irish residents 
to the anarchic impulses unleashed by mountain isolation, there is no short-
age of explanations for Appalachian frontier violence. When the rise and 
fall of the state of Franklin and the corresponding level of regional hostili-
ties are briefly examined, many of these earlier raisons d’êtres regarding 
postrevolutionary Appalachian violence are replaced with more compelling 
explanations grounded in specific historical circumstances and a complex 
collision of political and economic forces. The violence surrounding the 
Violence, Statecraft, and Statehood 
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state of Franklin resulted from the intersection of three primary causes: 
national and regional postrevolutionary political instability, fierce regional 
and state economic and political competition, and finally skillful and deter-
mined Amerindian diplomatic and martial resistance to western encroach-
ment. In the end, culture and physiography proved much less important 
factors than the struggle for regional economic and political hegemony in 
the chaos surrounding the state of Franklin.
Since the “discovery” and “invention” of Appalachia in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century, local color writers, missionaries, reformers, and 
scholars have offered their own ideas regarding the root causes of Appala-
chian violence. Two of the earliest and most persistently reoccurring argu-
ments offered to explain the perception of a hyperviolent mountain culture 
by relying upon ethnic and cultural generalizations and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Appalachia’s past, both of which are challenged by the 
socioeconomic conditions surrounding the state of Franklin. Beginning in 
the 1880s, the outbreak of feuds and labor militancy associated with the 
trauma accompanying rural industrialization resulted in the application of 
the principles of social Darwinism to Appalachia in order to decipher the 
underlying factors behind mountain violence.2 The fallacious notion that 
nearly all southern Appalachians descended from Scotch-Irish immigrants 
gave birth to the idea of the “Appalachian Highlander,” who carried a cul-
tural and historical propensity to act “clannish”; live outside of the law; and, 
most important, repeatedly and unabashedly engage in acts of violence.3 In 
his 1989 work Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, historian 
David Hackett Fischer updates the cultural comparison of southern Appa-
lachia to the Scottish Highlands. Fischer argues that in what he labels as 
“border culture,” Highlands Scots, driven from their homes during the 
eighteenth-century clearances, carried their culture to Ireland (Ulster) and 
eventually on to the Appalachian Mountains. Fischer contends that several 
of the defining characteristics of this “border culture,” including individu-
alism, “autarchy,” and “retributive justice,” created a “climate of violence in 
the American backcountry.”4
Out of the search for an explanation for the perceived persistence of 
this violent and clannish “border culture” in the southern mountains 
emerged the theory of Appalachian isolation and the resulting cultural 
stagnation. In short, the absence of trade and transportation connections, 
geographic distances, and geological obstacles retarded cultural, political, 
and economic growth in the region. According to scholars, educators, and 
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reformers, Appalachian isolation preserved both positive and negative as-
pects of Scotch-Irish culture and prevented the “modernization” and 
“Americanization” of the southern mountains. When married to the “bor-
der culture,” in theory, Appalachian isolation perpetuated generational and 
trans-Atlantic mountain violence and offered a clear explanation for the 
brutal Indian wars of the eighteenth century, the Civil War bushwhacking 
and feuding of the nineteenth century, and the labor militancy of the twen-
tieth century.5
Of course, Appalachian scholars have spent the better part of fifty years 
demonstrating that both the “Appalachian Highlander”/”border culture” 
and isolation theories are at best exaggerated and at worst historically inac-
curate.6 As one historian notes, the Scotch-Irish were not nearly as cultur-
ally predisposed to violence as many scholars have asserted. Despite the 
Scotch-Irish bringing “fighting techniques like biting and eye-gouging to 
the colonies,” preexisting frontier conditions in the areas they settled were 
far more critical in determining the levels of backcountry violence than 
were ethnic origins.7 Furthermore, “assumptions about the cultural homo-
geneity” of southern Appalachia represent a “gross misrepresentation” of the 
region’s ethnic diversity.8 A cursory glance at the socioeconomic conditions 
in the upper Tennessee Valley during the Franklin separatist movement 
provides further evidence that ethnicity and isolation played very little role 
in the persistence of frontier violence in the southern mountains. First, the 
upper Tennessee Valley’s population at the end of the eighteenth century 
was relatively diverse and far from being homogeneously Scotch-Irish. In a 
survey conducted of the roughly 31,913 residents of the Tennessee country 
in 1790, approximately 83.1 percent were English, 11.2 percent were 
Scotch-Irish, and 2.3 percent were Irish. Additionally, the 1790 census also 
included Germans, Welsh, Dutch, Swiss, Alsatians, Africans, and French 
Huguenots.9 Many of the leading figures in the Franklin movement and 
the opposition party (Tiptonites) belonged to these minority groups, in-
cluding Franklin governor John Sevier (French Huguenot), adjutant gen-
eral of the Franklin militia George Elholm (Danish), and leading anti-
Franklinite Evan Shelby (Welsh).10
The “isolation theory” also proves historically inaccurate as an explana-
tion for Franklin-related violence. Appalachian scholars have effectively 
demonstrated that Appalachia has never been isolated from the rest of 
North America. Historian Wilma A. Dunaway convincingly argues that 
from the moment of Euroamerican contact, Appalachia’s indigenous resi-
COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
28 Kevin T. Barksdale
dents participated in a “capitalist export economy” that linked the region to 
global pelt markets. As Euroamerican settlements developed and advanced 
across the mountain backcountry, local and regional markets expanded 
that connected Amerindian and Euroamerican mountain communities to 
local, regional, and international markets. These market connections served 
as the conduits for not only the exchange of goods and services but also the 
transference of culture, technology, and information. As geographer Gene 
Wilhelm contends, “The idea that the Appalachian Mountains acted as a 
physical barrier . . . hardly stands up against the evidence at hand.” In his 
examination of early eastern Tennessee, historian David C. Hsiung thor-
oughly debunks the idea that the antebellum upper Tennessee Valley was 
cut off from the outside world. He argues, “East Tennessee’s road system 
and economic ties should dispel any notions that the region has been like a 
fly trapped in amber, isolated and untouched for generations.”11 Appala-
chian scholars’ identification of the existence and continued expansion of 
private and public roads, repeated demands for further internal improve-
ments, and evidence of regional market connections across southern Ap-
palachia have largely dispelled the antebellum “isolation theory.”12
Ethnicity and geographic isolation ultimately do not explain the high 
levels of violence and fear that surrounded the Franklin statehood move-
ment. However, postrevolutionary political instability within the national, 
state, and local governments and a high-stakes competition for control over 
the region’s emerging commercial economy and political system do stand as 
compelling causes underlying the anarchy of Tennessee Valley separatism. 
In his sweeping examination of the underlying factors behind America’s 
fluctuating homicide rates, historian Randolph Roth argues that frontier 
regions and communities were not intrinsically violent due to their cultural 
or ethic composition. Instead, Roth identifies four historical variables that 
he believes determined the level of backcountry homicide rates: confidence 
that a government is “stable” and effective at defending person and prop-
erty, belief in the “legitimacy” and integrity of a government, level of com-
munity cohesion fostered by socioeconomic and political bonds, and 
community acceptance of the authority of a ruling class. Roth’s analysis of 
the correlation between political stability and violence is particularly reveal-
ing when applied to the upper Tennessee Valley during the Franklin sepa-
ratist movement. Roth states, “If no government can establish uncontested 
authority and impose law and order, if political elites are deeply divided and 
there is no continuity of power or orderly succession, men can . . . take up 
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arms on behalf of particular political factions or racial groups and kill with-
out restraint.”13
Following the American Revolution, the national government struggled 
under the weight of the severely restrictive Articles of Confederation, war 
debts, specie shortages (British pound), currency deflation, the loss of Brit-
ish markets, and the destruction of America’s urban centers of commerce 
and the merchant fleet. Additionally, the United States proved incapable of 
protecting its western frontier from Amerindian resistance movements, 
foreign threats (Spain and Great Britain), and Western separatists.14 The 
North Carolina state government found itself in a very similar situation 
during the postwar years. North Carolina’s political leadership confronted 
a growing postrevolutionary Cherokee resistance movement on its western 
fridges, significant war debt, and disaffected western communities.15 The 
dire economic and political situation of both the national and the North 
Carolina governments created a geopolitical climate in the upper Tennessee 
Valley that was clouded by uncertainty and fostered widespread citizen 
discontent.
The Franklin statehood movement emerged out of this political uncer-
tainty and the policies enacted by both the Confederation Congress and the 
North Carolina Assembly aimed at solving these economic and diplomatic 
challenges. The beginning of the Franklin statehood movement was a di-
rect result of a piece of North Carolina legislation aimed at ameliorating the 
state’s postrevolutionary economic crisis. One of the many strategies the 
national government developed to reduce the national debt required that 
states with sizeable tracts of western lands either cede their territory to the 
federal government or face the prospect of being saddled with steep taxes on 
these lands. The national government in turn planned to divide up the 
ceded western lands, sell the tracts, and use the proceeds to reduce the na-
tional debt. Beginning in 1780, several of these states, including New York 
(1780) and Virginia (1781), relinquished their western territory to the na-
tional government. North Carolina’s political leadership was divided over 
the western land-cession issue. Many of the state’s eastern political leaders 
argued that the state’s investments in infrastructural development and In-
dian diplomacy made the territory simply too valuable to turn over to the 
national government. However, with the intentionally obscured support of 
western political figures, including many future leaders of the state of 
Franklin, the state finally ceded its western lands with the passage of the 
Cession Act in April 1784.16
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Despite the fact that many of the leading men of the upper Tennessee 
Valley lobbied and voted in support of the Cession Act, after the legisla-
tion’s passage, many of the region’s political and economic leading figures 
publicly criticized the legislation and used manufactured outrage to pro-
mote the creation of a new state out of their communities. The first official 
discussion related to the creation of an independent state occurred just four 
months after the passage of the Cession Act. During the legislature’s August 
meeting in Jonesboro, the forty delegates to the as yet unnamed Franklin 
Assembly decried their “abandonment” by the state of North Carolina with 
the passage of the Cession Act, relayed their fears that they were being 
thrown to the Indian “savages,” and expressed their desire to form an inde-
pendent state. As news of the Jonesboro meeting reached eastern North 
Carolina, the state’s political leadership quickly realized that western po-
litical and business leaders had duped them into passing the legislation. A 
few months later, North Carolina repealed the Cession Act, a decision that 
unleashed a wave of partisan anger across the Tennessee Valley and left 
many western residents unsure about who held political authority in their 
own neighborhoods.17
John Sevier (1745–1815), 
engraving. Courtesy of 
the North Carolina 
State Archives.
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The decision to repeal the Cession Act triggered the December 1784 
Jonesboro meeting, in which the first signs of political factionalism devel-
oped among the leaders of the upper Tennessee Valley. Proponents of state-
hood argued that the formation of a new state would allow them to direct 
their taxes toward improving their own regional infrastructure, encourage 
emigration into the region, and create a state government responsive to the 
demands of westerners. Former Revolutionary War hero turned Tennessee 
Valley politician John Sevier, a man destined to serve as the state of Frank-
lin’s only governor, initially led the opposition to the statehood proposal. 
Sevier and other statehood opponents warned that political separatism was 
a very radical proposition and asserted that North Carolina’s expansion of 
backcountry defenses and repeal of the Cession Act eliminated the primary 
grievances of western residents. Despite his initial reluctance to support 
statehood, William Cocke, one of Sevier’s most trusted advisors and the 
state of Franklin’s most skilled diplomat, ultimately convinced Sevier to 
join the movement. By the closing of 1784, North Carolina’s passage and 
repeal of the Cession Act had opened a deep fissure that polarized the Ten-
nessee Valley’s communities. A region once united by Indian warfare, the 
struggle for American independence, and a shared political and economic 
agenda succumbed to the political chaos and partisanship fostered by the 
North Carolina Assembly’s wavering western policies and the manipulative 
political machinations of an ambitious cabal of Tennessee Valley political 
and economic leading men.18
The political partisanship and regional instability that began with the 
Cession Act and statehood debates intensified the following year with the 
implementation of North Carolina’s “divide-and-conquer” strategy, de-
signed to peaceably defeat the separatist movement from within the region; 
the debate over the Franklin constitution; and the emergence and growth of 
a determined anti-Franklinite faction. Over the state of Franklin’s brief 
existence, three North Carolina governors, Alexander Martin (1782–85), 
Richard Caswell (1785–87), and Samuel Johnston (1787–89), oversaw the 
state’s strategy for derailing the separatist movement. The Martin adminis-
tration determined that the most effective approach for confronting the 
Franklinite government was to directly challenge the state’s leadership and 
rank and file. In February 1785, Governor Martin dispatched one of his 
military advisors, Major Samuel Henderson, to travel to the upper Tennes-
see Valley and apprise the governor of the level of citizen support for the 
statehood movement. Henderson also carried a letter from Martin to newly 
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elected Franklin governor John Sevier demanding an explanation for the 
separatist actions and stating unequivocally that the actions taken by the 
Franklinites were unconstitutional. Governor Sevier’s response to Martin’s 
letter laid out a number of reasons for the Franklinite declaration of inde-
pendence and encouraged Martin to throw his support behind the admis-
sion of Franklin into the confederation of states. Just a few weeks prior to 
being replaced as governor, Martin issued a threatening public manifesto to 
the leaders and supporters of Franklin, rejecting the reasons for separation 
and warning that “far less causes have deluged States and Kingdoms with 
blood” and that the actions of the Franklinites could set a precedent for 
other groups to engage in “dangerous and unwarranted procedures” that 
might ultimately topple the new American Republic. Martin’s manifesto 
exacerbated an already chaotic political situation in the Tennessee Valley, 
and the Franklinites accused Martin of attempting to “create sedition and 
stir up insurrection among the good citizens of this State, thinking thereby 
to destroy that peace and tranquility that so greatly abounds among the 
peaceful citizens of the new happy country.” Martin’s address to the resi-
dents of the Tennessee Valley also galvanized a growing minority faction of 
anti-Franklinites under the leadership of Washington County resident John 
Tipton. Tipton sent a response to Martin’s manifesto offering to “continue 
to discountenance the lawless proceedings of my neighbors.” The Franklin-
ites’ expression of concern for the intensification of communal factionalism 
and the Tiptonite response reveal the disruptive effects of political instabil-
ity within the communities of the upper Tennessee Valley.19
As Franklin’s leadership warned of “sedition” and “insurrection” and 
Tipton and his supporters aligned themselves with the state of North Caro-
lina, Richard Caswell began his term as North Carolina’s governor. In 
sharp contrast to Governor Martin’s confrontational handling of the 
Franklin affair, the Caswell administration initiated a much less threaten-
ing policy, aimed at defeating the separatist movement from within and 
avoiding the outbreak of violence. In what can best be described as a “di-
vide-and-conquer” strategy, Caswell engaged in direct diplomacy with the 
leadership of Franklin, supported a parallel state bureaucracy with the up-
per Tennessee Valley, and repeatedly made offers to pardon the Franklinites 
if they restored their loyalties to the state of North Carolina. If the Caldwell 
policy unfolded as planned, it would reduce anti–North Carolina rhetoric, 
expand the growing faction of anti-Franklinites, and topple the Franklin 
government without loss of life or disruption to the regional economy. 
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Richard Caswell’s policy was also influenced by two underlying factors: his 
close personal and business relationship with John Sevier and his own fi-
nancial interests in the upper Tennessee Valley. Governor Caswell owned 
sizeable tracts of land in the region and even went as far as to jointly specu-
late in land during the Franklin affair with his friend John Sevier.20
Despite the effort to rely on diplomacy to peaceably undermine the 
Franklin movement, the expansion of support for the Tiptonites and the 
political competition and civic disruption fostered by the existence of a 
competing internal bureaucracy ultimately resulted in an intensification of 
regional partisanship and elevated the likelihood of violence. Beginning 
with the state and local elections of 1786, North Carolina maintained its 
own regional courts, polling stations, law-enforcement officials, and militia 
in the upper Tennessee Valley. As one Tennessee historian explains, the 
residents of the upper Tennessee Valley “were presented with the strange 
spectacle of two empires exercising at one and the same time over one and 
the same people.” Unsurprisingly, John Tipton and his loyalist supporters 
dominated the North Carolina–backed elections and political offices. Both 
factions conducted their own discrete 1786 regional elections without any 
real incidents of violence. The Franklinites and the Tiptonites erected poll-
ing stations, and the statehood issue dominated the political climate as the 
sides rallied under the banners of “new state” and “old state” men. In the 
end, the Franklinites and the Tiptonites elected their own slates of represen-
tatives, but the results reveal an intensification of political polarization, 
further destabilization of the region’s communities, and the effectiveness of 
Caswell’s divide-and-conquer strategy.21
Following the 1786 elections, political rancor escalated across the re-
gion and eventually sparked the first physical confrontations between 
Franklinite and Tiptonite partisans. Much of the initial violence surround-
ing the Franklin government resulted from the competing state bureaucra-
cies and the subsequent legal confusion and challenges to regional political 
and economic hegemony. Both the Franklinites and the Tiptonites under-
stood the economic importance of controlling the region’s courts and po-
litical offices. From deciding on which road construction projects to fund 
to recording land sales, backcountry courts stood as the seats of political, 
legal, and of course fiscal power in the upper Tennessee Valley. Addition-
ally, state and county officials exerted tremendous power over the region’s 
political economy, and controlling the offices was paramount for both re-
gional partisans.
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As both factions sought to assert their own dominance over the region’s 
judicial system and local offices, the county courts became the sites of vio-
lent altercations. In Washington County, John Tipton held court at Buffalo, 
and James Sevier simultaneously presided over the Franklin court, just ten 
miles away in the town of Jonesboro. In the winter of 1786, Tipton and a 
group of approximately fifty men burst into Sevier’s Washington County 
courtroom, destroyed legal documents, and forced the court to shut down. 
In retaliation, the Franklinites targeted Tipton’s Buffalo court, destroying 
court documents and disrupting the proceedings. Remarkably, the first and 
only direct confrontation between the states’ two leading protagonists, 
John Sevier and John Tipton, occurred in a Jonesboro courtroom. After a 
verbal altercation between Sevier and Tipton, John Sevier struck Tipton 
with a cane, and Tipton countered with a flurry of punches. Bystanders 
managed to separate the two combatants, but the frequency of these types 
of courtroom brawls led one Tennessee Valley resident to quip that “fami-
lies took lessons in pugilism from each other at public meetings.”22
The office of sheriff also took on a heightened degree of importance 
and danger as the hardening of political positions increasingly sparked re-
gional violence in and out of courtrooms. One such “recounter” occurred in 
the summer of 1787, when North Carolina’s Washington County sheriff, 
Jonathan Pugh, attempted to arrest John Sevier’s son James for failure to 
pay North Carolina taxes. When Franklin’s Washington County sheriff, 
Andrew Caldwell, received word of the impending arrest, he confronted 
Pugh in Jonesboro. After he “violently struck and abused” Pugh, Caldwell 
arrested the North Carolina sheriff, then “put him in prison and shut the 
door.” The significance of the altercation between the two Washington 
County sheriffs dramatically increased after John Sevier publicly pro-
nounced that the Franklinites “paid no obedience to the laws of North 
Carolina” and that he personally “despised her [North Carolina’s] authori-
ty.” The Tiptonites swiftly responded to the assault and abuse of Sheriff 
Pugh. Flanked by a sizeable group of armed men, Tipton entered Jonesboro 
in search of Andrew Caldwell. Unable to locate the Franklin sheriff, the 
Tiptonites again raided the Jonesboro courthouse and destroyed court 
documents. The Tiptonite raid nearly plunged the entire region into civil 
war when an erroneous report circulated that John Sevier had been arrested 
and was being held at John Tipton’s Washington County farm. The Frank-
linites quickly organized a large militia of two hundred men and made 
plans to assault the Tipton farm. Fortunately, John Sevier managed to get 
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word to his armed supporters that he was not being held by Tipton, but the 
narrowly averted raid and the rapidity with which the region’s citizen-sol-
diers mustered to the apocryphal report reveal the unintended consequenc-
es of North Carolina’s divide-and-conquer tactics and the growing specter 
of backcountry violence.23
By the opening of 1788, the Franklin statehood movement stood on 
the precipice of collapse. The Franklinite diplomatic effort aimed at secur-
ing support for the state’s admission into the union failed despite the re-
peated attempts of the state’s most skilled diplomat, William Cocke. The 
Caswell administration’s strategy for toppling the Franklin government by 
fomenting internal divisions, quietly supporting the swelling opposition, 
and repeatedly dangling pardons, lucrative state positions, and tax conces-
sion had paid huge dividends. The number of anti-Franklinites continued 
to increase as the Franklin government slowly watched regional support 
fade and key members of its leadership return their loyalties to North Caro-
lina. Despite the occasional flare-up of localized violence and the visceral 
feelings of fear and uncertainty that shrouded the region, the Caswell strat-
egy seemed to succeed in minimizing the potential threat of an all-out 
civil war. However, the events that occurred in February 1788 proved just 
how illusory the Caswell strategy’s successes had been.24
Predictably, the climactic clash between the Franklinites and the Tip-
tonites began as a result of the bureaucratic uncertainty created by the exis-
tence of two parallel state governments functioning simultaneously in the 
region and the partisan anger built up after nearly three years of political 
and legal wrangling. At the end of February, John Tipton ordered Wash-
ington County sheriff Jonathan Pugh to travel to John Sevier’s Plum Grove 
plantation and confiscate Sevier’s slaves as payment for delinquent North 
Carolina taxes. Tipton directed Pugh to remove Sevier’s slave property to 
his own farm on Sinking Creek. It is almost certain that John Tipton knew 
that his actions would provoke Sevier and his supporters, and the anti-
Franklinite leader retreated to his home with over 50 armed loyalists, await-
ing Sevier’s response. News of the confiscation of his slaves reached John 
Sevier as he mustered the Franklinite militia in preparation for a raid on the 
Overhill Cherokee towns dotting the lower Tennessee Valley. Sevier im-
mediately ordered the Franklin militia to Tipton’s farm to restore the gov-
ernor’s property. Approximately 150 Franklinite troops reached the 
Washington County farm on the morning of February 27, 1788, and 
quickly surrounded the Tiptonites barricaded in the farmhouse.25 The re-
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turn of Sevier’s slaves served as the impetus for the standoff, but both sides 
realized that much more was at stake that frigid morning than simply pri-
vate property and unpaid taxes. Bolstered by Governor Caswell’s support 
for the region’s North Carolina bureaucracy and blinded by seething anger 
fueled by political partisanship, John Tipton’s actions stood as a direct chal-
lenge to Franklin’s political and economic sovereignty. Once again, the 
Tiptonites attempted to enforce North Carolina laws and collect North 
Carolina taxes in the state of Franklin. As the Franklin government strug-
gled to survive the winter of 1788, Sevier and his supporters knew that what 
was unfolding on Tipton’s farm would have significant consequences for 
the future of their statehood movement and their own political and eco-
nomic positions within the region.
While the Franklinite forces paraded outside of the home of their chief 
political opponent, John Sevier instructed Colonel Henry Conway to carry 
a flag of truce, accompanied by a demand that the Tiptonites surrender to 
the Franklin militia and accept the legal authority of the state of Franklin. 
Tipton responded to Sevier’s ultimatum, stating that “he begged no favours, 
and if Sevier would surrender himself and leaders, they should have the ben-
efit of North Carolina Laws.” There was no mention of slave property or 
taxes in these initial exchanges, and each side simply demanded that the 
other accept their political authority. As the two political factions finally 
faced off on the banks of Sinking Creek, nothing less than political and 
economic control over the upper Tennessee Valley was at stake. After the 
initial exchange, the Franklin militia set up camp and continued to march 
menacingly around the Tipton property. As the sun set on the first day of the 
siege, John Tipton managed to get word to his supporters relaying his dire 
predicament, and a small detachment of troops under the command of Cap-
tain Peter Parkinson set off from Jonesboro to reinforce the Tiptonite forces.26
As night fell on the Tipton farm, the outbreak of hostilities commenced 
with Franklinite forces firing on Parkinson’s troops. Despite a hail of bul-
lets from both sides, three horses were initially the evening’s only casualties. 
As the Franklinite and Tiptonite troops continued to exchange fire, two 
women inside the Tipton home attempted to flee the “fiery fracas” under 
the cover of darkness. One of these women escaped unharmed, but the 
other, Rachel Devinsly, “received a ball through her shoulder” and became 
the only human casualty of the opening round of the Battle of Franklin. 
The next morning (February 28), additional North Carolina loyalist troops 
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from neighboring Sullivan County received word of the backcountry 
standoff. After dispatching a small force to halt the advance of these Tip-
tonite reinforcements, John Sevier sent a second flag of truce, requesting 
that the anti-Franklinites submit to the authority of the state of Franklin. 
Tipton again refused, informing Sevier that “all I wanted was a submission 
to the laws of North Carolina, and if they would acquiesce with this pro-
posal I would disband my troops here and countermand the march of the 
troops from Sullivan.” Once again, these exchanges reveal the efforts of 
Sevier and Tipton to assert their state’s authority in a region gripped by 
three years of political instability. As each side proved incapable of breaking 
the diplomatic impasse, troops from both political factions made prepara-
tions for the impending pitched battle.27
As a strong winter snowstorm cloaked the region in a cover of white-
ness, John Sevier dispatched a small detachment of troops commanded by 
his two sons, John and James, to intercept the Sullivan County reinforce-
ments before they could rendezvous at the Tipton farm. Less than three 
hundred yards from the Tipton farm, the small expedition led by the Sevier 
sons encountered some of the Sullivan County Tiptonites. After briefly 
exchanging fire with a portion of the Tiptonite reinforcements, the Frank-
linite forces quickly reversed course and sped back through a blinding 
snowstorm to rejoin the main body of militia troops. The appearance of the 
Sullivan County reinforcements outside of the Tipton farm offered the 
anti-Franklinite men a long-awaited opportunity to attack Sevier’s Franklin 
militia and break the siege. A witness to the events that morning described 
what transpired next: “A great body of Sullivan men attacked him [Sevier] 
with heavy firing, and rushed among them, took a number of prisoners, 
arms, saddles, and dispersed the whole of the Franklinites.” As the Sullivan 
County forces engaged the Franklinites, John Tipton and the remainder of 
the barricaded Tiptonites “sailed out [of the farmhouse] and drove them 
[the Franklinites] from their ground without much resistance.” The rapid 
turn of events caught the Franklinites off guard and forced their leader 
John Sevier, who was a few miles from the farm at the time of the engage-
ment, to “retreat without his boots.”28
Both factions suffered several casualties during the Battle of Franklin. 
Franklinite John Smith sustained a fatal shot to the thigh, and Henry Pol-
ley and Gasper Fant each received devastating wounds to their extremities. 
During their hasty retreat, the Franklinites’ delaying fire led to the deaths 
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of Washington County sheriff Jonathan Pugh and Sullivan County militia-
man John Webb, as well as the wounding of Captain William Delancy and 
John Allison. Slowed by the driving snowstorm, the troops under the com-
mand of John Sevier and James Sevier finally reached the Tipton farm 
shortly after the Franklinite retreat. The Franklinites rode “up to the camp 
[with] Col. Sevier’s flag still flying,” unaware of the “sudden & complete 
change in affairs that had taken place during their brief absence.” As they 
approached the Tipton home, “a volley of guns arrested them and some few, 
amazed & wondering were pulled from their horses & called in to surren-
der, among them, James & John Sevier [Jr.] & their cousin John Sevier.” 
Shortly after their capture, Governor Sevier learned of the fate of his family 
and sent John Tipton a message “asking [for] his life [and that] of his par-
ties” and agreeing to “submit to the Laws of the State” of North Carolina. 
After initially threatening to hang Sevier’s two sons, John Tipton released 
the members of the Sevier family and accepted John Sevier’s capitulation.29
Despite the repeated diplomatic failures, the crushing military defeat 
on the fields of John Tipton’s farm, the near-complete collapse of the state 
government, and Governor Sevier’s promise to restore his loyalty to North 
Carolina, the Battle of Franklin did not signal the end of either the upper 
“The Escape of Governor John Sevier,” engraving. Courtesy of the North Caro-
lina State Archives.
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Tennessee Valley’s political instability or the violence surrounding the 
Franklinite movement. Throughout the remainder of 1788, significant sup-
port for Sevier and the separatist movement remained in the newest Frank-
lin counties in the lower Tennessee Valley. Driven by valuable and contested 
land claims, Sevier, Blount, and Greene County residents continued to 
support the Franklin government. Even the replacement of moderate gover-
nor and Sevier associate Richard Caswell by political hardliner Samuel 
Johnston a few months prior failed to persuade Sevier and the Franklinite 
holdouts to submit to North Carolina’s authority. Bolstered by a significant 
faction of regional loyalists, and despite a warrant being issued for his arrest 
for treason by the state of North Carolina, John Sevier refused to uphold his 
promise to “abide by the laws” of North Carolina and even made a failed 
attempt “to raise a militia of their party to march against Colonel Tipton.” 
In response, John Tipton requested “a few volunteers to quell the Insurrec-
tion” and “save [the region] from future bloodshed” from neighboring 
Washington County, Virginia. The existence of an arrest warrant also did 
not deter Sevier from frequent visits to Jonesboro and its neighboring com-
munities. The day before his arrest for treason, the former governor of 
Franklin (Sevier’s term expired in March 1788) entered the town of Jones-
boro with a group of ten to twelve armed men on horseback. The group 
eventually stopped at the home of David Deaderick, who was being visited 
by former Franklin sheriff Andrew Caldwell. Deaderick described what 
unfolded that afternoon in a deposition taken by North Carolina justice of 
the peace William Cox. According to Deaderick, Sevier demanded “Whis-
key or Rum” from him. Upon learning that Deaderick had no alcohol, Se-
vier asked Caldwell “nearly the same respecting Liquor,” and the former 
sheriff also “informed him he had none.” Sevier then became angry and 
“began to abuse this place, then its inhabitants without distinction.” Dead-
erick and Caldwell confronted Sevier, asking him “if he aimed that dis-
course or abuse at” them. Sevier answered, “Yes, at you or anybody else,” 
and then called Deaderick “a son of a Bitch.” Deaderick replied “[that Se-
vier] was a dead son of a Bitch, and stepped close to Sevier, who immedi-
ately drew out his pistol.” The altercation eventually spilled out into the 
Jonesboro street, where Sevier accused Caldwell of owing him money, 
pulled his pistol, and threatened to shoot him. As Sevier waved his pistol in 
the air at Caldwell, the gun discharged and wounded Richard Collier, an 
innocent onlooker. Sevier and his men quickly fled the scene of the shoot-
ing, but the incident highlights the continued threat of violence surround-
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ing the separatist movement. The fact that Sevier turned his weapon on a 
former ally also reveals the political instability that continued to breed vio-
lence in the region’s communities.30
Shortly after the Jonesboro shooting, John Tipton and a small posse of 
a dozen men, armed with a North Carolina arrest warrant, tracked Sevier 
down at the home of a Franklinite widow. With John Sevier accused of 
“High Treason in levying troops to oppose the Laws and Government of 
this State” and using “an armed force [to] put to death several good Citi-
zens” by the Johnston administration, North Carolina and its Tennessee 
Valley loyalists finally arrested him. Tipton initially proposed hanging Se-
vier on the spot but eventually agreed to allow his political rival to be trans-
ferred across the mountains to stand trial in the eastern North Carolina 
community of Morganton. Despite Sevier’s appeal to remain in Washing-
ton County to stand trial, the Tiptonites shackled the Franklinite leader, 
paraded him in front of Tiptonite supporters, and finally transported him 
to the Burke County jail to await trial. The Tiptonites turned their pris-
oner over to Burke County sheriff William Morrison, a former Revolution-
ary War soldier who had fought under Sevier at the Battle of King’s 
Mountain; Morrison immediately released the prisoner from his irons and 
escorted him to the nearest tavern. A short time later, Sevier and a small 
group of Franklin supporters simply rode out of Morganton and returned 
to their communities in the upper Tennessee Valley. The former governor 
of the state of Franklin never stood trial for his participation in the Battle 
of Franklin or the Jonesboro shooting.31
Sevier’s arrest signaled the effective end of the Franklin statehood 
movement and with it a decrease in violence within the Tennessee Valley 
communities. As former separatists, including John Sevier, returned their 
loyalties to North Carolina, with many reclaiming their former political 
and civic positions within state and local government, the political instabil-
ity that had fueled regional violence subsided. However, the fear and threats 
of violence resulting from white encroachment, land speculation, and the 
former state of Franklin’s aggressive and uncompromising Indian policies 
continued to plague the region. Even as the Tennessee Valley communities 
experienced some level of internal political stabilization, the Overhill and 
Chickamauga Cherokees remained determined and defiant in the face of a 
rapidly expanding American population. Only slightly less significant than 
the impact of political destabilization and economic competition, this Am-
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erindian resistance movement played a central role in creating the percep-
tion and reality of backcountry disorder.32
Relations between the upper Tennessee Valley’s white settlers and the 
region’s dominant Amerindian group, the Overhill Cherokees, remained 
confrontational throughout the eighteenth century. From the first appear-
ance of Euroamerican settlers in the region, the Overhill Cherokees had 
struggled to defend their territory and villages from white encroachment by 
utilizing a sophisticated plan that combined strategic territorial and trade 
concessions, direct diplomatic engagement, and targeted martial resistance. 
The Overhill Cherokee policy directly led to the fragmentation of their own 
Tennessee Valley communities; served as an underlying impetus for the 
Franklin separatist movement; and, most important, contributed to the en-
demic fear and violence that dominated the trans-Appalachian backcountry.
Beginning with the 1773 lease agreement between the region’s earliest 
Watauga settlers, the Overhill Cherokee leadership embraced at least some 
level of territorial concessions to Euroamerican westerners in the Tennessee 
Valley. The first significant Cherokee-white land sale in the region occurred 
in 1775, when Richard Henderson, a former North Carolina judge and 
successful land speculator, secured twenty million acres from the Cherokees 
for two thousand English pounds and ten thousand pounds’ worth of trade 
goods. At that time, the Henderson Purchase stood as the largest private 
land deal in American history and initiated a wave of land sales between the 
Overhill Cherokees and the region’s leading land speculators. Not all of the 
Overhill Cherokee leadership agreed with the territorial transactions. 
Cherokee chief Dragging Canoe denounced the land deals and eventually 
broke away from the Overhill Cherokee alliance, establishing separate In-
dian towns on the banks of Chickamauga Creek. Under the leadership of 
Dragging Canoe, the Chickamauga Cherokees refused to accept the terri-
torial treaties with American westerners and launched a bloody resistance 
movement that targeted Tennessee Valley western settlements, land survey-
ors, and mountain travelers.33
The backcountry chaos reaped by Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga 
warriors forced western settlers to expand and improve their backcountry 
defenses. As the intensity of the Cherokee-white conflict raged during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, increased western demands for fund-
ing for internal improvements in order to construct and bolster backcountry 
forts, pay and equip militia companies, and bribe Amerindian leaders 
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placed considerable strains on Euroamerican governments. This financial 
burden, created by western demands for internal improvements and the 
expenses associated with Indian diplomacy and warfare following the 
French and Indian War, served as one of the primary causes that led the 
British government to enact the Proclamation of 1763. One of the most 
important and controversial provisions of the 1763 colonial legislation es-
tablished a boundary line, roughly following the Appalachian Mountain 
chain, between white western settlements and Native American territory. 
The colonial legislation reserved the territory west of the Proclamation Line 
for Amerindian residents and forbade western land speculation and settle-
ment in the region. According to historian Woody Holton, these British 
colonial concessions to the indigenous westerners and the obstacles the 
policies presented to western land speculation served as one of the deter-
mining factors cementing backcountry resident’s patriot loyalties during 
the American Revolution.34 Following the Revolution, the new American 
government and several state governments resumed the British policy of 
Amerindian diplomacy and compromise. During the Franklin affair, the 
state of North Carolina passed legislation that attempted to establish and 
protect Native American territorial reserves from western land speculators 
and squatters. This shift in state Indian policy did not go unnoticed by the 
political and economic leadership of the upper Tennessee Valley and qui-
etly emerged as one of the key factors behind the Franklin separatist move-
ment. Although this was never stated explicitly, the leaders of the Franklin 
movement believed that the establishment of an independent state govern-
ment would allow them to replace North Carolina’s conciliatory Indian 
policy with a much more aggressive strategy aimed at forcing further land 
concessions and eventually driving the region’s native people from the Ten-
nessee Valley. The coupling of a sophisticated and determined Cherokee 
resistance movement, the national and the North Carolina governments’ 
Indian diplomacy, and Franklin’s aggressive and threatening Native Amer-
ican policy resulted in high levels of postrevolutionary Indian-white vio-
lence across the Tennessee Valley backcountry.35
A brief survey of Indian-white relations during the Franklin period il-
lustrates the violent consequences of the collision of Indian resistance and 
Franklinite policies. Shortly after the establishment of the Franklin govern-
ment, the Tennessee Valley separatists revealed their contentious Amerin-
dian policy during their earliest Indian treaty negotiations. In the summer 
of 1785, a small delegation of Franklinites, including John Sevier, Joseph 
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Hardin, Luke Boyer, Ebenezer Alexander, Joshua Gist, and Alexander Out-
law, parlayed with Overhill Cherokee leaders at the mouth of Dumplin 
Creek in an effort to purchase a sizeable swath of Indian land. The negotia-
tions surrounding the Treaty of Dumplin Creek established the basic con-
tours of Franklinite Indian diplomacy. The Franklinites aggressively 
demanded land concessions from the Cherokee leaders and made few if any 
concessions of their own. The Franklinites all but guaranteed favorable 
treaty terms by excluding Cherokee leaders critical of further land sales 
from the negotiations and threatening violence if those chiefs in attendance 
failed to acquiesce to their demands. Whether the Indian representatives’ 
action was pragmatic or not, the huge Cherokee tract of land they sold at 
Dumplin Creek further enflamed Chickamauga Cherokee anger and em-
boldened Franklin’s political leaders.36
As reports of backcountry violence perpetrated by both whites and In-
dians and the Dumplin Creek negotiations reached political leaders in 
North Carolina and New York, U.S. Indian agents drafted plans for a large 
Indian treaty council to be held at Hopewell, South Carolina. The negotia-
tions and agreements reached at Hopewell provide a striking contrast to the 
Treaty of Dumplin Creek. First, the U.S. Indian agents and Cherokee 
diplomats did not include either the Franklinites or the Chickamauga 
Cherokees in the meetings. However, the U.S. government did invite all of 
the other tribal leaders, including over a thousand additional representa-
tives from Cherokee towns. From November 18 through November 29, 
1785, Benjamin Hawkins, Joseph Martin, Andrew Pickens, and Lachlan 
McIntosh, the congressionally appointed Indian commissioners, engaged 
the Cherokees in a series of talks that proved to be far more equitable and 
compromising than the Dumplin Creek parlays. While territorial issues 
remained at the forefront of these talks, the maintenance of peaceful back-
country relations also stood out as a diplomatic priority. Additionally, the 
U.S. negotiators at Hopewell accepted the concept of Cherokee territorial 
sovereignty and included a provision that allowed the Indians to force white 
squatters off of their lands.37
Although the Treaty of Hopewell was perceived as a great diplomatic 
victory by the Cherokees, it created a backlash that accelerated backcountry 
violence across the Tennessee Valley. The treaty contained provisions that 
restored Overhill Cherokee lands in the region by disavowing earlier con-
troversial and often coerced land cessions. The Hopewell negotiators also 
agreed to disallow the recently signed Treaty of Dumplin Creek and return 
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these lands to Cherokee control. The return of the Dumplin Creek lands to 
the Cherokees meant that several of the state of Franklin’s most significant 
towns and communities, including the new Franklin capital of Greeneville, 
now rested in Cherokee territory. As news of the Hopewell Treaty terms 
reached the state of Franklin, the state’s political leadership quickly rejected 
the Cherokee land restoration and maintained the validity of the Dumplin 
Creek land purchases. The Treaty of Hopewell and the resulting threats to 
Franklinite land claims and individual wealth strengthened regional sup-
port for the separatist government and Franklinite resolve to maintain and 
expand the state’s geographic boundary. Simultaneously, the treaty bol-
stered the Overhill Cherokees’ resistance efforts by dubiously giving the 
tribe’s leadership confidence that they could count on support from the 
United States and the state of North Carolina in their efforts to defend their 
communities and lands. The diplomatic and economic reverberations from 
Hopewell all but ensured the escalation of backcountry violence as both the 
Franklinites and the Cherokees struggled to come to grips with the terms of 
the treaty.38
Throughout the remainder of the state of Franklin’s existence, the Over-
hill Cherokees and American communities experienced perpetual back-
country warfare and faced the constant threat of violence. The Franklinites 
simply ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Hopewell and the United 
States’ and North Carolina’s conciliatory Native American policies and con-
tinued to encourage their citizens to purchase and settle on Dumplin Creek 
lands. Despite the protestations of Cherokee leaders, white encroachment on 
Cherokee land continued apace. The inability (or perhaps unwillingness) of 
the national and North Carolina governments to enforce the provisions of 
Hopewell and remove Franklinite squatters from Cherokee lands predict-
ably led Chickamauga Cherokee leaders Dragging Canoe and métis John 
Watts to initiate a series of backcountry raids across the Tennessee Valley. In 
1786, Watts and a force of nearly a thousand Chickamauga Cherokee war-
riors raided settlements near the community of Knoxville. In response, 
Franklinite militia forces under the command of John Sevier attacked and 
burned a number of Overhill Cherokee towns a few months later. This cycle 
of retaliatory violence defined Indian-Franklin relations from 1786 through 
1788 and left hundreds of Cherokee and American casualties and decimated 
communities across the Tennessee Valley.39
Amid the escalating Indian-white warfare, two significant events oc-
curred that further fanned the flames of backcountry violence. In the face 
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of increasing demands for additional Indian land transactions from re-
gional land speculators and commercial farmers, the Franklin government 
initiated another round of treaty negotiations with the Overhill Cherokees 
in the summer of 1786. Relying on the same tactics of selective chief invita-
tion and threats of violence, Franklin diplomats pressured Cherokee leaders 
into selling another large area of land. The Treaty of Coyatee not only 
governed the sale of Indian lands but also contained extraordinarily threat-
ening language warning against any future Cherokee resistance to white 
encroachment. The Franklin diplomats warned the Overhill Cherokees in 
attendance not to resist their territorial expansion or “kill any of our people,” 
for the consequences of such actions would lead to the destruction of “the 
town that does the Mischief.”40
The signing of the Treaty of Coyatee, the opening of a Franklin land 
office in order to divide and sell former Cherokee lands, and the renewal of 
Indian diplomacy with the Cherokees by both the U.S. and North Carolina 
governments triggered another round of Indian raids and American coun-
terattacks during the final months of 1786. The year 1787 witnessed a 
further intensification of backcountry violence perpetrated by both whites 
and Indians that climaxed in the spring of 1788 with a particularly grue-
some set of murders that eventually sparked outrage on both sides of the 
Appalachian Mountains and hastened the downfall of the Franklin govern-
ment. In May 1788, a Cherokee named Slim Tom viciously hacked down 
eleven members of the Kirk family, living just a few miles from the Overhill 
Cherokee capital of Chota on the Tennessee River. According to the only 
surviving member of the family, John Kirk, Slim Tom, “with a party of 
Sattigo [Citico] and other Cherokee Indians,” fell upon his family; “mur-
dered my mother, brothers and sisters in cold blood”; and mutilated the 
“smiling faces” of the Kirk children. In response, John Sevier mustered the 
Franklin militia and prepared to retaliate against Overhill Cherokee towns. 
Accompanied by a vengeful John Kirk and facing little resistance from the 
Indians, the Franklinite forces attacked a number of Overhill Cherokee 
towns. After burning several towns and killing dozens of Indians, the 
Franklinites turned their attention to the Overhill Cherokee town of Chil-
howe, unfortunately the hometown of Slim Tom. After laying siege to the 
town, the Franklinites invited two Cherokee chiefs, Old Tassel and Old 
Abraham, who just happened to be meeting in Chilhowe at the time of the 
attack, to meet with them to discuss terms of peace. Both Cherokee chiefs, 
who were widely known to be among the Cherokees’ strongest proponents 
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of peace, agreed to meet with the Franklinites in John Sevier’s tent. As the 
two Cherokee leaders and their party approached the Franklinite encamp-
ment, “[John Kirk and James Hubbard] fell on the Indians, killed the Tas-
sel, Hanging Man [sic], Old Abram, his son, Tassell’s [sic] brother, and 
Hanging-Man’s [sic] brother, and took in Abram’s wife and daughter—
brought in 14 Scalps.” Under a flag of truce, the Franklinites cut down the 
two Cherokee leaders most dedicated to amity and effectively undermined 
any chance for the cessation of backcountry violence. Despite Sevier’s pro-
testation that he was absent when Kirk and Hubbard murdered the Chero-
kee chiefs, the events that transpired that May morning were widely 
condemned by the U.S. administration and the political leadership of 
North Carolina. After receiving support from the U.S. Congress, North 
Carolina governor Samuel Johnston issued an arrest warrant for Sevier and 
the other members of the Franklin militia involved in the murders. Despite 
Sevier’s eventual acquittal of the crime, the Kirk and Cherokee chief mur-
ders derailed any possibility of ending backcountry violence in the region. 
Sadly, the ramifications of the Franklinite Indian policies and the Cherokee 
resistance movement continued to breed violence, death, and destruction in 
the Tennessee Valley long after the collapse of the state of Franklin.41
This brief history of the state of Franklin leaves little doubt that the 
separatist movement was engulfed in near-perpetual violence during its less 
than four-year existence. Racked by political instability and internal fac-
tionalism fostered by economic and political competition, North Carolina’s 
divide-and-conquer diplomatic strategy, and a determined and well-sup-
ported antistatehood faction; the communities of the upper Tennessee Val-
ley constantly faced the threat of civil strife and bloodshed. The addition of 
a resolute and effective Cherokee resistance movement that relied upon di-
plomacy and warfare to halt territorial encroachment and to defend Chero-
kee backcountry communities further escalated the level of fear and violence 
in the region. Despite efforts to offer ethnic, cultural, and geographic expla-
nations for the persistence of backcountry violence in the region, these are 
the primary factors that underlie the “effusions of blood” in the upper Ten-
nessee Valley following the American Revolution.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Randy Roth for sharing his work and insight into the 
nature and causes of frontier violence.
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